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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Hoffman raised several issues in his Opening Brief. He deems those not 
specifically addressed in this brief to have been satisfactorily addressed in prior briefing 
and would submit them accordingly. 
However, there are other issues and arguments made by the State which he 
feels require a reply. They are: the District Court's error in applying the wrong standard 
of review; the District Court's error in summarily dismissing the petition in light of the 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC) claim relating to the failure to obtain discovery 
and challenge the search of the car's trunk; and the District Court's error in summarily 
dismissing the petition in light of the IAC claim relating to the failure to consult about or 
file a direct appeal. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Hoffman's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the State implicitly conceded that the District Court erred by not 
adhering to the proper standard governing what may be included in the post 
conviction record, and thus what may be properly considered by the post 
conviction court? 
2. Whether the District Court erred by summarily dismissing the IAC claim in regard 
to the failure of trial counsel to obtain discovery, and subsequently pursue a 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained through an illegal search of the car's 
trunk? 
3. Whether the District Court erred by summarily dismissing the claim arising from 
the failure to consult over and file an appeal? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The State Implicitly Conceded That The District Court Erred By Not Adhering To The 
Proper Standard Governing What May Be Included In The Post Conviction Record, And 
Thus What May Be Properly Considered By The Post Conviction Court 
A. Introduction 
The State, in reviewing Mr. Hoffman's argument regarding whether an 
evidentiary hearing was warranted regarding the reasonableness of the initial traffic stop 
in this case, decided that he had made a valid argument, and so conceded the point. 
Mr. Hoffman relied only on the verified pleadings and other properly-included 
documents. He asserts that, by conceding to his argument, the State also conceded 
that the District Court erred in not similarly limiting its review. 
B. The State Has Conceded That The District Court Erred By Not Properly 
Reviewing The Information Contained In The Verified Pleadings And Other 
Properly-Included Information 
Mr. Hoffman made the argument that the District Court made a fundamental error 
by taking judicial notice of the "record in the underlying case." (See App. Br., pp.13-15.) 
He argued that, while certain documents could, and properly did, receive judicial notice, 
it was improper of the court to review the unspecified remainder of the underlying 
record. (See App. Br., pp.13-15.) 
In its response, the State admitted that Mr. Hoffman had made a meritorious 
argument in regard to whether an evidentiary hearing reviewing the reasonableness of 
the traffic stop was warranted. (Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) It conceded that, under the 
standard set forth in Baldwin v. State, Mr. Hoffman had raised a genuine issue of 
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material fact in that regard, and that he is entitled to relief in the form of an evidentiary 
hearing on that issue. (Resp. Br., pp.8-9 (citing Baldwin, 145 Idaho 148 (2008).) 
Mr. Hoffman's argument in that regard relied only on the properly-included information 
and documents in the post conviction record. 1 (See generally, App. Br., pp.29-31.) 
Thus, the State, by conceding that argument was correct, also implicitly limited itself to 
the properly-included documents in the post conviction record. The court did not adhere 
to this standard. (See e.g. App. Br., pp.13-17, 25-26, 29-31, 37-39.) Therefore, by 
accepting the Baldwin standard as proper, the State has also implicitly conceded that 
the court erred by not adhering to that standard. Because of this rudimentary error by 
the court, Mr. Hoffman should be granted relief. 
Furthermore, by conceding that Mr. Hoffman has made a valid showing of a 
genuine issue of material fact based only on the information included in his verified 
pleadings, the State implicitly concedes that the factual allegations made in his verified 
pleadings constitutes sufficient and admissible evidence for a post conviction 
proceeding. Therefore, it also implicitly concedes that the District Court erred in 
its repeated assertion that Mr. Hoffman had offered no facts in support of his claims. 
(See e.g. R. pp.92-117, 155-65.) Because of this rudimentary error by the court, 
Mr. Hoffman should be granted relief. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate the summary dismissal and remand this 
matter for an evidentiary hearing. 
1 This includes Mr. Hoffman's various veri·fled and notarized written statements. 
Because they are verified, they function as affidavits, which are admissible evidence in 
a post conviction preceding. See Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993); 
and I.C. § 19-4907(a). 
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11. 
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing The IAC Claim In Regard To The 
Failure Of Trial Counsel To Obtain Discovery, And Subsequently Pursue A Motion To 
Suppress The Evidence Obtained Through An Illegal Search Of The Car's Trunk 
A. Introduction 
The State claims that Mr. Hoffman has failed to show a genuine issue of material 
fact in regard to the IAC claim for failing to request discovery or file a motion to 
suppress the evidence found during the illegal search of the vehicle. (Resp. Br., pp.8-9 
n.5.) However, in this case Mr. Hoffman has made verified allegations, supported by 
various factual assertions and evidentiary documents.2 (R., 1-31.) The State generally 
denied the truth of these claims. (R., 78.) That denial of Mr. Hoffman's supported and 
verified allegations create a genuine issue of material fact (whether those verified and 
supported allegations are true). What the State really appears to be claiming in its 
arguments is that, even if all Mr. Hoffman's evidence and allegations are assumed to be 
true, he would still not be entitled to relief, thus justifying the summary dismissal. See 
Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. 
However, Mr. Hoffman's allegations and evidence regarding the failure to obtain 
discovery, if assumed to be true, would entitle him to relief because he would have 
shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for that unprofessional errors by 
each of his attorneys, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have 
2 Because of the civil nature of a post conviction proceeding, the fact that the State is 
the party moving for summary dismissal, the District Court must consider all the facts in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Mr. Hoffman. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho 
at 155 (holding that, because Mr. Baldwin presented facts in his Petition and Affidavit 
that would entitle him to relief if he were able to prove them at a hearing, summary 
dismissal was inappropriate). 
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been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984 ). For this issue, 
the outcome that would have been different is his decision to plead guilty. See e.g. 
Padilla v. Kentucky, _ U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010); see also Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
Specifically, regarding the discovery issue, the State claims that Mr. Hoffman has 
not proven his attorneys did not request discovery, and that even if they had, the failure 
to show him those documents does not result in prejudice. (Resp. Br. pp.11-16.) 
Regarding tl1e search itself, the State argues that Mr. Hoffman would not have 
succeeded in his motion to suppress because he was a passenger and did not have 
standing (a.k.a. a reasonable expectation of privacy) to allow him to challenge the 
search of the car, and relevant case law emerged after his case had been decided. 
(Resp. Br., pp.8-9 n.5.) 
However, the two items that a petitioner must show to be successful in an 
inefficient assistance of counsel claim are: a failure of counsel to provide assistance in 
an objectively reasonable manner, and a showing of prejudice resulting from that failure. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Therefore, in order to defeat tl1e State's arguments, 
Mr. Hoffman need only demonstrate: (1) his attorneys' failure to request discovery 
constitutes an objectively unreasonable proffer of assistance; and (2) he was prejudiced 
by that error because there is a reasonable probability that, had his attorneys provided 
adequate assistance in t~1is regard, he would not have pied guilty, as he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the car and then-controlling law would have led to 
suppression of the evidence found during the illegal search. 
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B. Mr. Hoffman's First Three Attorneys Failed To Provide Objectively Reasonable 
Assistance By Failing To Request Discovery 
First, to be clear, Mr. Hoffman's argument is that his attorneys erred by not filing 
requests for discovery, and not, as the State seems to believe, that counsels' error was 
not sharing discovery with Mr. Hoffman. (See e.g. App. Br., p.21; contrast with Resp. 
Br., p.11.) Failing to request discovery constitutes a failure by all three attorneys to 
perform at an objective standard of reasonableness, satisfying the first element of the 
IAC claim. (See App. Br., pp.19-20, 26-28.) 
Mr. Hoffman alleged that Mr. Dewey (1 ), 3 Mr. Nielson (2), and Mr. Martinez (3) all 
failed to file a request for discovery during the relevant time. (See e.g. R., pp.2, 12-14, 
16, 21, 26, 29, 127-28.) Since this is a guilty plea case, the "relevant time" is the time 
before l\/lr. Hoffman entered his guilty plea. This is because the decision which must be 
reasonably probable to change, had effective counsel been provided, is the decision 
to plead guilty. See e.g. Padilla 130 S. Ct. at 1485; see also Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59. 
Mr. Hoffman supported this allegation by attaching the relevant portion of the Record of 
Actions (RoA) from the underlying case to his Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction 
Relief (Petition and Affidavit) as Exhibit H. (R., pp.42-43.) They clearly show that, 
during the relevant time, none of his attorneys filed any requests for discovery.4 (See 
R., pp.42-43.) 
3 During prior briefing, it has become confusing which of the five defense attorneys 
below is being referred to in a particular circumstance. Therefore, for clarity's sake, 
each attorney's name, accompanied by a number indicating in which order he appeared 
on Mr. Hoffman's behalf, will be used to distinguish between them. 
4 The only Requests for Discovery in the Register of Actions (hereinafter, ROA) were 
filed by the prosecutor, which the State concedes does not have a bearing one way or 
the other on Mr. Hoffman's claims. (See R., p.42-43 and Resp. Br., p.12.) 
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The State's only argument on this point is tl1at just because Mr. Hoffman had not 
been shown any discovery does not mean his attorneys did not request it. (Resp. Br., 
pp.12-13.) Therefore, the State claimed, he should not be granted relief. (Resp. Br., 
p.13.) It did not, however, present any evidence to counter the conclusive evidence 
Mr. Hoffman did present through the ROA. Rather, it points to a letter from one of 
Mr. Hoffman's attorneys included with his Petition and Affidavit which says that police 
reports were enclosed with it. (Resp. Br., p.13 (citing R., p.36).) 
However, this is where being clear as to which attorney is being discussed is 
critical. The letter was sent from Mr. Mallard (4). As the letter states, Mr. Mallard (4) 
was not retained until after Mr. Hoffman entered his guilty plea. (R., p.36.) Therefore, 
whether or not Mr. Mallard (4) presented tl1e reports to Mr. Ho'ffman is irrelevant to the 
question of whether Mr. Dewey (1 ), Mr. Nielson (2), and Mr. Martinez (3) requested said 
reports and other discovery during the relevant time. The State also points out that the 
letter indicates the reports were provided to Mr. Mallard (4) by the Bannock County 
Public Defender's Office. (Resp. Br., p.13.) However, the letter does not indicate when 
the Bannock County Public Defender's Office received those documents. (See 
R., p.36.) They could have been received after the relevant time, and thus, Mr. Hoffman 
still suffered from ineffective assistance from his attorneys. Therefore, the letter sent 
from Mr. Mallard (4) does not specifically rebut Mr. Hoffman's allegations that none of 
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his attorney's requested discovery within the relevant time.5 Because Mr. Hoffman's 
allegations in this regard are unrebutted, they must be accepted as true. Baldwin, 145 
Idaho at 153. 
This demonstrates that, at least, there is a genuine issue of material fact which, if 
resolved in his favor, would entitle Mr. Hoffman to relief. Therefore, summary dismissal 
was inappropriate. Nonetheless, because his attorneys failed to provide objectively 
reasonable assistance, Mr. Hoffman 17as satisfied the first step of tl1e IAC claim. The 
second step of this claim - that he was prejudiced by these unprofessional errors - will 
demonstrate that he would be entitled to relief under those facts. 
C. Mr. Hoffman Was Prejudiced By His Attorneys' Failure To Request Discovery 
Because Discovery Would Have Revealed That The Search Of Tile Car Was 
Illegal And The Evidence Found In The Trunk Would Have Been Suppressed, 
Thus Changing Mr. Hoffman's Decision To Plead Guilty 
It is first important to establish what standard governs Mr. Hoffman's burden in 
this argument, as well as whether the court properly applied that standard. Second, 
there are two issues in regard to whether Mr. Hoffman had a legitimate claim for tl1e 
evidence found in the trunk of the car to be suppressed. The first is whether he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the car, such that he had standing to challenge the 
5 Mr. Hoffman continues to assert that he has never seen any discovery, which would 
include the reports allegedly included in Mr. Mallard's (4) letter. (See e.g. 
R., pp.146-47, 150 (where Mr. Hoffman asserts under oath in July 2010 that "At no time, 
even to the present has said discovery been provided.").) Mr. Mallard's (4) letter is not 
notarized or verified as under oath, so cannot be accepted as inherently true, unlike 
Mr. Hoffman's verified statement to the contrary, so it is not certain what documents, if 
any, were actually enclosed with that letter. The State had the opportunity to provide 
evidence, such as an affidavit from Mr. Mallard (4), to rebut the allegation, but it failed to 
do so. Therefore, under Baldwin, the unrebutted factual assertions made by 
Mr. Hoffman must be accepted as true. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. 
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search. The second is whether, under then-controlling law, his claim was likely to have 
been successful. 
1. The District Court Misapplied The Strickland Standard When Determining 
Whether Mr. Hoffman Had Been Prejudiced By His Attorneys' Failure To 
Provide Him With Objectively Reasonable Counsel 
The State conceded that Strickland sets forth the proper standard governing 
what a petitioner must prove in order to demonstrate prejudice in an IAC claim. (Resp. 
Br., p.14 n.6.) That standard is that the petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The District Court 
did not apply this standard. Instead, it required Mr. Hoffman to show "that the outcome 
of his case would have been different but for his attorneys' unprofessional errors." 
(R., p.164.) 
The State claims that the District Court merely misspoke, and that it was aware 
of the Strickland standard. (Resp. Br., p.14 n.6 (citing R., p.100).) However, just 
because the court was aware of the Strickland standard does not logically lead to the 
conclusion that it actually applied it, especially since the difference between the 
Strickland standard and the one articulated by the court are so drastically different. The 
Strickland standard, as the United States Supreme Court explained, only requires that 
"confidence in the outcome" be undermined. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Conversely, 
the standard articulated by the District Court requires Mr. Hoffman to demonstrate that 
the outcome would have been different. The District Court's standard requires far more 
than a mere undermining of confidence in the outcome; it requires a definitive showing 
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that the outcome would change. It is illogical to assume that just because the District 
Court was aware of some other, lower standard, it would unconsciously apply a 
standard other than the one it articulated.6 
Because of this rudimentary error by the District Court, this Court should grant 
Mr. Hoffman relief. 
2. Mr. Hoffman Had A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy In The Car, And 
So Had Standing To Challenge The Search 
Under Idaho law, both at the time of Mr. Hoffman's case and now, if a driver of a 
car is not also the owner of that car, he has a reasonable expectation of privacy only if 
he is authorized by the owner to be driving the car. State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 
719 (Ct. App. 2006). Mr. Hoffman alleged in his verified Petition and Affidavit that he 
was taking the car on a test drive, with the prospect of potentially purchasing the car. 
(R., p.11.) The nature of this action inherently implies that he had discussed the activity 
with the car's owner and had his permission to take the car on a test drive. 
The State, however, asserts that Mr. Hoffman was merely a passenger in the 
vehicle, and as a passenger who was not the owner, he did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the car. (Resp. Br., p.8 n.5.) Firstly, that is an inaccurate 
6 Look, for example, at the fact that Mr. Hoffman asserts that had his attorneys 
requested discovery and properly pursued a motion to suppress, he "never have agreed 
to plead guilty." (R., p.128.) Under Strickland, this undermines confidence in the 
outcome, and so makes summary dismissal inappropriate. However, under the 
standard articulated by the District Court, it does not show that the outcome would have 
been different because it does not, by itself, demonstrate that the motion would have 
been filed or proven, and so the outcome might still have been the same, therefore 
making summary dismissal appropriate. Under only one of these standards is summary 
dismissal justified and the court issued a summary dismissal in this case. Therefore, it 
is logical to assume it applied the standard that justified its actions. 
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characterization of the facts. Since the State presented no evidence to rebut 
Mr. Hoffman's verified allegations, those allegations must be taken to be true. Baldwin, 
145 Idaho at 153. Therefore, the fact is that Mr. Hoffman was more than a mere 
passenger - he was the driver. See e.g. Rakas v. /1/inois, 439 U.S. 128, 129 (1978) 
(distinguishing between those with a possessory interest in the car and those who are 
"merely passengers"); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 122-23 (1977) 
(wherein the Supreme Court discusses the difference between the driver and the 
passenger of a vehicle, implying that the driver is the person in physical control of the 
car and the passenger is not). 
The driver who has the owner's permission to be driving the car has a 
possessory interest in the car. See e.g. State v. Pabillore, 133 Idaho 650, 653 (Ct. App. 
1999) ("that one driving or occupying a rental vehicle, who is neither the renter nor an 
authorized driver under the rental agreement, has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the vehicle and, hence, lacks standing to complain of the vehicle's subjection to a 
search. This proposition is supported by numerous authorities"). 7 Mr. Hoffman, 
however, has an even more firmly established possessory interest in the car, as he was 
a potential buyer. Since the State did not present any rebutting evidence, 
Mr. Hoffman's assertion that he was test driving the vehicle in the hope of buying it must 
be taken as true. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. Thus, he had both the owner's permission 
to drive the car, as well as a possessory interest in it, and so had standing to challenge 
the search. 
7 See e.g. United States v. Riazco, 91 F.3d 752, 754-55 (5th Cir.1996); United States v. 
Jones, 44 F.3d 860,871 (10th Cir.1995); United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117,119 
(4th Cir.1994); United States v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885, 887-88 (10th Cir.1990). 
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Secondly, the State's argument, taken to its logical conclusion, would mean that 
no driver of a rental car would have an expectation of privacy in the rental car because 
they are not the owner of the car. This position is contrary to Idaho law, which sets forth 
the premise that the critical inquiry is not whether the person is the owner of the car, but 
whether the person is authorized by the owner to drive the car. See e.g. State v. Cutler, 
144 Idaho 272, 274 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that Mr. Cutler, who was not listed on the 
rental agreement as an authorized driver and who had not participated in negotiations 
with the owner, could not challenge the search of the rental car); Hanson, 142 Idaho at 
719 (holding that Mr. Hanson was not afforded an expectation of privacy because he 
offered no evidence to prove he was authorized to be driving the car). As Mr. Hoffman 
presented evidence of his authorization to be driving and had negotiated with the owner, 
he could challenge the search under then-controlling law. 
Even if this Court determines that Mr. Hoffman had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy, he still could potentially be able to challenge the search. "If the stop was illegal 
at the outset or later turned into an unlawfully extended detention, the passenger has 
standing to challenge evidence taken during a subsequent search because the 
passenger's own freedom of movement has been infringed by the stop." 
State v. Foldesi, 131 Idaho 778, 780 n.2 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Haworth, 106 
Idaho 405,406 (1984); State v. Troughton, 126 Idaho 406,410 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. 
Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 237-38 (Ct. App.1994)). Therefore, since, as the State conceded, 
Mr. Hoffman has a legitimate claim against the legality of the initial stop, even if he were 
deemed to be a passenger, he still could have standing to challenge the subsequent 
13 
search of the car if it is determined that the stop was illegal at the outset. Therefore, at 
the least, this issue must be conditionally remanded for review. 
Therefore, since the facts alleged by Mr. Hoffman, which must be assumed to be 
true, establish that he was the driver, in control of the car, and was authorized by the 
owner to be driving the car, Mr. Hoffman had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
car and has standing to challenge the illegal search of that car. 
3. Under The Then-Controlling Law, Mr. Hoffman's Motion To Suppress 
Would Likely Have Been Granted, And Thus, There Is A Reasonable 
Probability That He Would Not Have Decided To Plead Guilty 
First, to be clear, Mr. Hoffman's argument is that the illegal search of the car's 
trunk violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and not, as the State seems to think, that 
pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. Gant, his motion 
to suppress would have been successful. (See e.g. App. Br., p.32-33; contrast with 
Resp. Br., pp.8-9 n.5.) 
While Mr. Hoffman did cite to Gant in his opening brief, he did so only because it 
was the most recent recitation of the standard governing warrantless searches: that 
they are per se unreasonable unless the situation qualifies under one of the 
well-established and narrowly-construed exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
(See App. Br., p.32 (citing Gant, 556 U.S. 332, _, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009)). 
Nevertheless, this standard was controlling law at the time of Mr. Hoffman's case, as 
a unanimous United States Supreme Court established it as the rule in 1978. 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, while Mr. Hoffman could not 
have based his argument on the holding in Gant, he can still base it on this particular 
premise, which was set forth in Mincey and reaffirmed in Gant. 
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Regardless, Mr. Hoffman would likely have succeeded in ~1is motion to suppress. 
The law governing Fourth Amendment violations due to searches of vehicles incident to 
arrest at the time of his case was set forth in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
Idaho had adopted the Belton rule. See State v. Charpentier, 131 Idaho 649, 653 
(1998). The Belton rule permitted officers to search the passenger compartment of a 
vehicle incident to arrest. Charpentier, 131 Idaho at 652 (citing Belton, 453 U.S. at 
461 ). However, that rule did not permit the police to extend their search to the trunk, 
because the trunk was not part of the passenger compartment and "closed car 
trunks are accorded some level of privacy protection." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 
416 n.6 (2005) (citing Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.4); see also State v. Schmadeka, 136 
Idaho 595, 598 n.2 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Belton, 453 U.S. 454; Charpentier, 131 Idaho 
649). 
In Mr. Hoffman's case, he alleged in his verified Petition and Affidavit that the 
evidence was found in the trunk of the car. (R., p.7.) The State presented no evidence 
to rebut that allegation. Because his verified allegation was unrebutted, it must be 
accepted as true. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. Therefore, without any further evidence, 
based on the then-governing law established by Charpentier, Schmadeka, Belton, and 
Caballes, Mr. Hoffman's motion to suppress would likely have been successful since 
searches of vehicles incident to arrest could not extend to the closed trunk of the car. 
Had any of his attorneys requested discovery during the relevant time, they would have 
been able to fully assess this argument. Mr. Hoffman alleges that the discoverable 
evidence would have supported his allegations, and again, that went unrebutted and so 
must be accepted as true. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. Therefore, he has 
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demonstrated that he had a viable motion to suppress that the evidence would have 
borne out. 
Ergo, there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. 
In fact, in his Modified Motion, Mr. Hoffman articulates the prejudice "Had Martinez [(3)] 
provided petitioner with effective assistance, filing for suppression, the outcome of this 
case would have differed in that petitioner would never have agreed to plead guilty." 
(R., p.128.) Mr. Hoffman's statements under oath as to the fact that had the appropriate 
motion to suppress been filed, he would not have pied guilty, along with the availability 
of a complete challenge to the physical evidence underlying the charge, sufficiently 
undermine confidence in the outcome, wf-1ich is all that is required under the Strickland 
standard. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
As a result, Mr. Hoffman has demonstrated that the ineffective assistance of his 
counsel caused him prejudice. He has thus satisfied both steps of the IAC claim. 
In doing so, he has established that he would be entitled to relief on these allegations 
and facts, as they are assumed to be true. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. Therefore, 
this Court should grant him the requested relief and vacate the summary dismissal and 
remand this case for an evidentiary hearing on this matter. 
Ill. 
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing The Claim Arising From The Failure 
To Consult Over And File An Appeal 
Mr. Hoffman alleges that Mr. Mallard (4) failed to provide him adequate 
assistance because he failed to consult with Mr. Hoffman about his appellate options 
and failed to file a Notice of Appeal when Mr. Hoffman directed him to do so. The State 
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responds with the argument that the record does not support Mr. Hoffman's allegations. 
It also claims that, particularly as to the "failure to consult" argument, the issue is 
inappropriately raised for the first time on appeal. 
However, even if the State is correct, Mr. Hoffman is still entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on this allegation. Furthermore, the allegation that Mr. Mallard (4) failed to 
consult with Mr. Hoffman was raised below. Finally, the record does support 
Mr. Hoffman's allegations. 
A. Even If The State's Arguments In This Regard Are Correct, They Demonstrate 
That Mr. Hoffman Is Entitled To An Evidentiary Hearing On This Matter 
In order for summary dismissal to be appropriate, the petitioner must fail to 
demonstrate either that a material issue of genuine fact exists or that he would be 
entitled to relief assuming his claims are true. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. The State 
rebuts Mr. Hoffman's allegations on this claim by arguing that the record disproves 
Mr. Hoffman's allegations. (Resp. Br., p.17.) That, in addition to its general denial of 
his allegations in its answer, establishes there is a genuine issue of material fact 
because Mr. Hoffman, under oath, swore that these allegations were true. 
Since there is a genuine issue of material fact, the only other reason why 
Mr. Hoffman should be denied an evidentiary hearing on this issue is if he has not 
demonstrated that he would be entitled to relief if all that he has claimed is assumed to 
be true. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. However, the United States Supreme Court 
has long recognized that where counsel's unprofessional actions deprive a defendant 
of the entirety of the process, the defendant need not make a specific show of 
prejudice because it is presumed. Roe v. Flores-Orlega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000) 
(citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984); Penson v. Ohio 488 U.S. 75, 
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88-89; and Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286 (2000)). Mr. Hoffman alleges that 
Mr. Mallard's (4) ineffective assistance deprived him of the entirety of the appellate 
process because Mr. Mallard (4) failed to consult with him about his appeal options or to 
file the notice of appeal when Mr. Hoffman requested that Mr. Mallard (4) do so. Thus, 
Mr. Hoffman is presumed to have been prejudiced by Mr. Mallard's (4) ineffective 
assistance. Since he was prejudiced, he would be entitled to relief. See Roe, 528 U.S. 
at 487. 
Therefore, even if the State is correct in its assertions - and Mr. Hoffman does 
not concede that it is - summary dismissal was inappropriate and he is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on this matter because he demonstrated both that a genuine issue 
of material fact exists and that if it were resolved in his favor, he would be entitled to 
relief. 
B. The Issue Of Failure To Consult Was Raised Below, And So This Court Has 
Jurisdiction To Review The District Court's Summary Dismissal 
Mr. Hoffman put several issues before the District Court in his verified Petition 
and Affidavit. Among them was his claim that Mr. Mallard (4) had provided ineffective 
assistance because he provided patently incorrect legal advice and failed to consult with 
Mr. Hoffman about his appeal options or, upon Mr. Hoffman's direction, to file the 
appeal. (See App. Br., p.45 (citing R., pp.18-20, 37.) The State asserts that these 
issues, the failure to consult in particular, are put improperly before this Court as they 
were not raised below. (Resp. Br., pp.20-21.) That assertion is contrary to the 
evidence in the record. 
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Mr. Hoffman put both issues before the court. In his initial verified Pleading and 
Affidavit, he first alleges that he "specifically asked/requested Kelly to file a Direct 
appeal of the original Sentence through letters, family members calling, Certified 
Registered mail/letters to Kelly .... " [sic] (R., p.18.) This raises the issue of failing to 
file the appeal, which constitutes a failure to engage in a purely ministerial task, and 
thus ineffective assistance. (See App. Br., p.48 (citing Roe, 528 U.S. at 477).) Second, 
he alleges, "Kelly should have Consulted Hoffman Regarding His right to appeal when 
inquired, but did not." [sic] (R., p.19.) This raises the issue of failing to consult 
regarding the appeal, which constitutes a failure to provide effective assistance to the 
client. (See App. Br., pp.49-50 (citing Roe, 528 U.S. at 478, 480-81).) 
He also reiterated both allegations in his Memorandum in Support of Post 
Conviction, filed with his Modified Motion for Post Conviction Relief. (R., p.142, items 
(g) and (i).) The State's assertion that these issues, in particular the failure to consult, 
were not raised below is incorrect, as shown by the record. Because both issues were 
raised below, they are properly reviewable by this Court. 
C. The Record Affirms Mr. Hoffman's Allegations That Mr. Mallard (4) Failed To 
Consult With Him And Failed To File An Appeal At His Direction 
In his verified Pleading and Affidavit, Mr. Hoffman asserted that he, both 
personally and through other family members, requested that Mr. Mallard consult with 
him about the appeal and then file an appeal. See Section Ill, B, supra. The State 
introduced no evidence to rebut these assertions. Rather, it points to the letters 
Mr. Hoffman attached to his pleadings as evidence of proper conduct by Mr. Mallard (4), 
asserting they disprove Mr. Ho'ffman's allegations in this regard. 
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First, the State claims that Mr. Hoffman's notation on Mr. Mallard's (4) letter 
disproves his allegation. (See R., p.37.) Mr. Hoffman admits that notation does indicate 
that no appeal was filed. However, it does not disprove the allegations of his ineffective 
assistance, but demonstrates it. Mr. Mallard (4) would not communicate with his client, 
thus failing in his responsibility to consult on the matter. (R., p.37.) As a result, 
Mr. Hoffman was forced to focus on his post conviction arguments instead of his direct 
appeal. As a matter of fact, Mr. Hoffman only had until April 13, 2009, to file a notice of 
direct appeal. 8 Therefore, there was no reason for these letters, dated May 26, 2009, 
June 20, 2009, and August 3, 2009, to mention a now-elapsed direct appeal. 9 (See 
R., pp.33-35.) 
Furthermore, the fact that none of the letters references an instruction to file a 
direct appeal does not rebut Mr. Hoffman's verified allegations that before the time they 
were written, he had been attempting to contact l\/lr. Mallard (4) and obtain his 
consultation regarding his appeal. l'Jor does it rebut Mr. Hoffman's verified allegations 
that before that time, he had directed Mr. Mallard (4) to file a direct appeal. All it 
8 Because Mr. Hoffman's sentence had included a period of retained jurisdiction, he was 
permitted to delay filing an appeal until forty-two days after the disposition after 
jurisdiction is relinquished. See Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) (2008). The court's order 
relinquishing jurisdiction was filed on March 12, 2009. Therefore, he had until April 13, 
2009, to file an appeal. 
9 Furthermore, Mr. Mallard's (4) erroneous advice would have led Mr. Hoffman to 
believe that he only had until December 2, 2008, to file his direct appeal, as Mr. Mallard 
(4) advised that he had forty-two days from the "date of conviction" to file that direct 
appeal. (See R., p.37; Supp. R., p.34.) This also demonstrates the ineffective 
assistance provided by Mr. Mallard (4). If he relied on that advice, Mr. Hoffman would 
have believed his direct appeal had been forfeited long since, due to Mr. Mallard's (4) 
ineffective assistance, and thus would have been focused on his post conviction 
arguments by May of 2009. 
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indicates is that, by that time, Mr. Hoffman had begun preparing his post conviction 
claim instead. 
However, Mr. Hoffman's handwritten note does support ~1is allegation. It states 
that he desired to exercise his rights to file both an appeal and a Rule 35 motion at that 
time. Furthermore, other documents which Mr. Hoffman attached to his verified 
Pleadings and Affidavit support his allegations in this regard. For instance, in his log of 
telephone calls to Mr. Mallard (4), he states, "These are just a few of the times that I 
tried to contact Mr. Mallard [(4)] when I realized that I had better start keeping track and 
logging them." (R., p.41.) This statement indicates that there had been previous calls 
to Mr. Mallard (4) that Mr. Hoffman did not yet feel needed to be logged. 
None of the evidence in the record actually rebuts Mr. Hoffman's allegation that 
he was not afforded effective representation regarding his appeal. And since the State 
provided no additional evidence to rebut Mr. Hoffman's verified allegations, they 
must be accepted as true. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. Therefore, summary dismissal 
was inappropriate and Mr. Hoffman was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this 
matter, because, at least there is a genuine issue of material fact over when 
1\/lr. Hoffman contacted Mr. Mallard (4), and what he was requesting when. As the 
finder of fact, it was the District Court's job to make findings in this regard, and so an 
evidentiary hearing, at least, is necessary. 
Therefore, this Court should overturn the summary dismissal and remand this 
case for an evidentiary hearing. 
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CONCLUSION 
First, because the District Court failed to apply the proper standard to what the 
court could review and because, contrary to the court's assertion, Mr. Hoffman did 
present facts supporting his allegations, the decision to summarily dismiss this post 
conviction action was inappropriate. In light of these rudimentary errors, Mr. Hoffman 
respectfully requests this Court vacate the summary dismissal and remand this case for 
an evidentiary hearing. 
Furthermore, there is a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in his 
favor would entitle him to relief, in regard to the failure to obtain discovery that caused 
Mr. Hoffman prejudice and had a reasonable probability of changing his decision to 
plead guilty. Therefore, the decision to summarily dismiss this post conviction action 
was improper. Mr. Hoffman respectfully requests this Court vacate the summary 
dismissal and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing on this matter. 
Finally, there is a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in his favor 
would entitle him to relief, in regard to the failure to consult about, and file, a direct 
appeal that is presumed to be prejudicial. Therefore, the decision to summarily dismiss 
this post conviction action was improper. Mr. Hoffman respectfully requests this Court 
vacate the summary dismissal and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing on this 
matter. 
DATED this 6th day of December, 2011. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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